From: [email address removed] To: [email address removed] Subject: Attn: Jim M. Date: Wed, 25 Aug 2004 21:27:57 -0400
To Jim M.,
Thank you for your letter of June 15. We apologize for the great delay in replying to you.
During the Feb 15, 2003 demonstration in NYC we distributed thousands of copies of our leaflet "The Road Away From War" leaflets. After a few hours we had run out of leaflets and began chanting "Soldiers! Turn Your Gun's Around!". Some nearby comrades of the LRP began chanting with us. We were very pleased, as this contrasted with our experience with other left groups. This was our first contact with the LRP. Several months later, we attended the debate between the LRP and the SL, and were quite impressed with the LRP's presentation. We were particularly gratified to learn of your work in the transit workers union.
You began your letter of June 15 with the comment:
<< We want to continue these exchanges because we think there may be significant areas of agreement between us, even though until we have more substantial discussions regarding overall program, we cannot make any quick assumptions about how deep this agreement may be. This is something for us to probe and hopefully arrive at further understanding.>>
We also wish to continue these exchanges. We also think there may be significant areas of agreement between us, although that may not be apparent from looking at our exchanges from a purely literary point of view. Our criticisms, (and this letter will be critical, just as the previous ones were), are intended to sharpen understanding. We don't believe that we can be of service to the revolutionary movement if we blunt our criticisms in the (mistaken) belief that such would be more comradely.
Although we express our criticisms, it is not our aim to set ourselves apart from other militants who may see things differently. On the contrary, we believe that it is our duty to unite with other militants if there is a sufficient level of agreement, even if this agreement is not 100% complete. What is necessary for unity is agreement around the critical issues, the decisive issues. Not all differences are equally important. (Although an issue that is of secondary importance in one period, may become critical in another period). Sectarian windbags treat every difference as an issue deserving a split. We do not.
In your discussion of propaganda and agitation, you correctly argue that we must base our tasks on the concrete conditions in which we find ourselves.
<< Thus in discussing the form of our public presentations as they exist now, whether they are considered propagandistic or agitation, ... we are talking about what kind of public face we can have when those who are interested in revolutionary ideas are few and far between. >>
Those who are interested in revolutionary ideas are indeed few and far between. We would add that those who are interested in revolutionary ideas, are today, divided theoretically, programmatically and organizationally into many small competing groups. We do not believe that merely having correct politics will allow an organization to “break away from the pack” and attract the masses to itself at the expense of its competitors. Rather, we believe it is likely that a revolutionary party can only be forged through revolutionary regroupment.
By revolutionary regroupment, we do not mean a fictitious unity within a single organization of mutually hostile programs. Rather, we mean a unity based upon overcoming programmatic and theoretical differences through struggle.
We think the intensity of class struggle presents an objective factor which facilitates or hinders revolutionary regroupment. In the heat of class struggle, militants from diverse tendencies may gauge the revolutionary qualities of one another in actual practice. The commitment of militants, their willingness to struggle, the practical relationship between their ideas and their actions, their resistance to alien class influences, their clear-headedness -- all of these qualities are tested in the course of struggle. This testing of militants in struggle, allows old organizational forms to be replaced by new ones (hopefully stronger). In contrast, when the level of open class struggle is relatively low, not only is it difficult for militants to accurately appraise one another across organizational lines, but suspicions grow within organizations leading to organizational fragmentation rather than regroupment.
The possibilities for revolutionary regroupment today are very restricted, much as they were for the Left Opposition in the US from 1929-32. Nevertheless, it is important for revolutionaries to prepare theoretically and politically for such regroupment. The transformation from quiescence to open class struggle often develops at a fairly rapid tempo. Lack of preparation on the part of revolutionaries will translate into advantages for labor bureaucrats and reformists.
We see revolutionary regroupment as a central task in the next period in which “those who are interested in revolutionary ideas” are not few and far between. In the current period, we see political and theoretical preparation for such regroupment as a central task. The failure to see the need for regroupment, and the failure to prepare for such regroupment, we characterize as an ultra-left error. Such an error overestimates the abilities of a small group to attract a mass base, and underestimates the objective difficulties in establishing a mass revolutionary organization.
We see the work of politically and theoretically preparing for revolutionary regroupment as including the tasks of exposing, criticizing and combating those tendencies, arguments and theories which might be used to justify wrong policies with regard to regroupment. We also believe that doing common work with other organizations when conditions allow is an integral part of this preparation. The concrete basis for common work today is weak, yet there are areas in which we think organizations could, and should work together but do not. (For the sake of a more timely reply, we will not address the possibilities for common work today.)
<< Thus in discussing the form of our public presentations as they exist now, whether they are considered propagandistic or agitation, ... we are talking about what kind of public face we can have when those who are interested in revolutionary ideas are few and far between. >>
A qualitative step in the development of consciousness from vague militancy into revolutionary consciousness, comes when a militant realizes the need for historical and theoretical understanding -- the importance of absorbing the lessons taught by the bitter experience of others, and preserved in revolutionary traditions. The number of militants who have made this qualitative step, and are thus interested in seriously studying revolutionary ideas, are few and far between indeed. That is an undeniable sign of the weakness of the revolutionary movement today, and for this reason it is of the utmost importance to concentrate on developing and nurturing the consciousness of those who have taken this step. There cannot be the least doubt about this.
In today's circumstances, the mass of working people, even those engaged in some sort of struggle, consist almost wholly of individuals who have not yet made this qualitative step. Thus, agitation, which is the presenting of ideas to masses, today means presenting ideas to those who, for the most part, are not yet "interested in revolutionary ideas". It would be a grave mistake if revolutionary minded militants were to focus their energies primarily on agitation (popular propaganda) among these "backward" masses, to the neglect of efforts to develop the consciousness of those who have succeeded in appreciating the importance of revolutionary ideas, even if they are only at the beginning stages of learning these ideas.
Agitation is largely ruled out in today's conditions. However, there are restricted circumstances where agitation is appropriate and useful. When masses are in struggle, they may come to feel that their current (mis)leaders either do not know the way forward, or do not wish to go forward. The masses may not be *consciously* interested in revolutionary ideas per se, but they may be very interested in ideas that will help them in their situation, “even if” these ideas are "revolutionary". In some cases learning even one or a few revolutionary ideas, may convince an individual that learning more is worthwhile. This is a time when those that are revolutionary minded, can help those who are not yet revolutionary minded, take that critical qualitative step. The advanced, can help the more backward over the fence, so to speak. Not only do agitational efforts in this case increase the number of those who are "interested in revolutionary ideas", but they help to prevent those who are searching for the right road, from becoming victims of fake-revolutionaries who would lead them down the wrong road.
We don't think the points just made are controversial, and we suspect that you will agree with them. But there is a point we would like to make, with which you may disagree. The process of educating those who "are interested in revolutionary ideas" often has side effects which are directly visible to revolutionary militants -- a person buys a subscription to a periodical, or attends a class, or writes an email. However, the process of "helping the backward over the fence" does not always have immediately visible results. It may take some time between the planting of seeds, and their visible germination. Thus, in our opinion, it is absolutely incorrect to demand that agitation have visible results. Of course we *want* results. We would be pleased if our agitation resulted in immediate and visible demonstrations in support of our ideas. But we would not judge agitation to be not worthwhile merely on the basis that we could not observe any visible effects.
The orientation of the Left Opposition in the US in the period from 1929-1933 was toward propaganda. James P. Cannon wrote that "During that time, our small numbers, the general stagnation in the labor movement, and the complete domination of all radical movements by the Communist Party, imposed upon us the position of a faction of the Communist Party. Likewise, these circumstances made obligatory that our primary work be propaganda rather than mass agitation."
Cannon argued "If we constitute ourselves as an independent party, then we must appeal directly to the working class, turn our backs on the degenerated Communist Party, and embark on a series of efforts and activities in the mass movement. On the other hand, if we are to be not an independent party, but a faction, then it follows that we must direct our main efforts, appeals, and activities, not to the mass of 40 million American workers, but to the vanguard of the class organized in and around the Communist Party." "Our first task is to make the principles of the Left Opposition known to the vanguard." "who or what force constitutes the proletarian vanguard? Is it not an indisputable fact that there is no othere leading force [than the CP]..."
Toward the end of 1933, the US Trotskyists adopted the slogan "Turn from a propaganda circle to mass work". "The Comintern had been shattered by the debacle in Germany; and at the fringes of the Communist movement it was losing its authority...On the other hand, the masses...began to stir again."
The Trotskyist movement in the US had undoubtedly grown in the first five years of its existence. However, it was still a tiny organization in 1933 when it made the turn from propaganda to mass work. We do not believe that numerical growth was the decisive factor, but
rather
a. The complete domination of all radical movements by the Communist Party was broken
b. The masses had begun to stir again
c. The orientation of the Trotskyists changed from that of being a faction within the CP to that of creating a Fourth International
d. Documents explaining the principles of the Left Opposition had been published in the US and
were thus available to the vanguard.
We wish to elaborate on the last point.
Every great historical experience brings new lessons for the revolutionary movement. These lessons are at first absorbed by the revolutionary movement unevenly. Those elements of the revolutionary movement who absorb the lessons first, must propagate this knowledge to those who lag behind. New historical experiences generate propaganda tasks.
The Russian revolution, as well as the other revolutionary movements in that period generated a wealth of new knowledge. This knowledge was at first propagated by the Communist International. However, before this knowledge could be fully absorbed by the revolutionary movement internationally, the Russian Communist Party, and the Communist International began to degenerate. The Left Opposition represented those elements of the communist movement who most fully absorbed the lessons of the revolutionary period, and who were also absorbing the ongoing lessons of the period of reaction.
Before 1928, the principle documents of the Left Opposition were not available in the US. This imposed upon the Left Opposition in the US a very specific propaganda task -- the task of publishing the those documents. By 1933, the principles of the Left Opposition were no longer a secret. They were “known”, or at least available, to most of those who really wanted to know them. Even though (and in part because) the Trotskyist organization was tiny, and even though (and in part because) the majority of those who were “interested in revolutionary ideas” in general were not yet interested in Trotskyism in particular, the US group adopted the position “Turn from a propaganda circle to mass work”.
<< On the other hand, despite some individual working-class participants and a few small labor contingents, the anti-war movement is clearly primarily middle-class in composition and political outlook. >>
Independent working class politics is almost unknown to the current generation of workers in the US (and not just in the US). The AFL-CIO labor bureaucracy is solidly behind the main capitalist parties. Protest movements, when they do not openly involve the cooperation of sections of the main capitalist parties, typically have a pro-capitalist or at least "middle-class" orientation.
Workers developing a sense of hatred towards imperialism's adventures are thus likely to attend anti-war demonstrations, even though these demonstrations feature bourgeois speakers, even though they attract masses of non-working class elements, and even though they attract (relatively) privileged workers as opposed to the most oppressed workers.
At these rallies and demonstrations, these awakening workers will be exposed to groups that call themselves "communist" and "socialist", yet who provide friendly platforms for bourgeois politicians. If these awakening workers belong to unions, they may be exposed to bureaucrats from the AFL-CIO who are also "against the war". The message that they will receive from these sources is that class-collaboration, for the sake of opposition to war (or whatever the issue of the day) is good. They will be given the message that sections of the labor bureaucracy can be trusted. In short, they will be fed all sorts of illusions.
For better or for worse, these workers, as they develop a sense of hatred towards imperialism's adventures, are among the most politically advanced workers in the US. For example, a transit worker who attends an anti-war rally, is probably far more likely to be open to reading Revolutionary Transit Worker, than a co-worker who doesn't find the war in Iraq to be an issue for him or herself.
We thus see it as an absolutely critical task to politically challenge those forces that are attempting, with significant success, to lead radicalizing workers down the path of "left" support for the bourgeoisie. The presence of bourgeois politics and bourgeois politicians, and the masses of "middle-class" elements at these demonstrations does not provide an adequate reason, in our opinion, to belittle the importance of "popular propaganda" written in a style accessible to workers attending these events. As long as such demonstrations are poles of attraction to radicalizing workers, we thing revolutionaries should endeavor to attract these workers away from bourgeois politics and toward revolutionary politics.
In a previous email we wrote:
<< The public activity of our group has been exclusively what we have termed agitational, but what you may or may not consider propagandistic. After the initial collapse of the anti-war movement, we attempted to make a turn toward propaganda, but as an organization, we were unable to do so. We are again attempting to develop propaganda.>>
<< You warn us about the dangers of opportunism to small organizations which have focused there efforts on agitation. We thank you for the warning, and further request that you be frank with us if you feel that we have fallen into opportunism. Most importantly, we would hope that you support your opinions with arguments, and make a sincere attempt to guide us onto a more correct path. >>
You responded:
<< In these straits the danger of opportunism resulting from refraining from theoretically advanced propaganda in order to engage primarily in agitation is in fact quite large. (We are not saying this to accuse you of opportunism. But if any of us blind ourselves to a proven danger, the consequences should not be surprising.>>
<< Then an organization that feels that its primary purpose in a given period is carrying out agitation will be forced to tailor its message to the state of consciousness of the masses in the period, such that there can be a realistic expectation for action as a result. This is why you should recognize the great pressure toward opportunism when the consciousness of the masses who are being addressed is at a low level: prioritizing agitation to an audience of backward workers means adapting to a very low level of consciousness far away from the revolutionary goal. There is no law that says opportunism is inevitable in this situation. We simply should recognize the danger.>>
As we have mentioned, we are in favor of conducting propaganda, and are working to develop our capacities in this area. You correctly point out, elsewhere in your email, that reformists and centrists may say many correct things, while being incorrect on the most important, or critical issues of the day. We do not aim to adopt this practice. We are more concerned with developing propaganda which is correct on the essential issues, than in developing propaganda per se. Before an organization can generate “theoretically advanced propaganda” it needs to become “theoretically advanced”.
We appreciate your concern that we may mistakenly “refrain from theoretically advanced propaganda in order to engage primarily in agitation.” We will continue to bear your concern in mind.
We wrote in a previous email:
<< Whether your definition is better or worse than the one we have used, whether we have "misunderstood what agitation is" we can leave aside for now. The important thing is the political implications, and we can discuss these without complete agreement over the meaning of words.>>
We still believe that the important thing is the political implications. We believe can understand each others arguments if we know the definitions we respectively use. We do not think we must agree on definitions in order to have meaningful discussion. However, we are unsure if you are satisfied with this arrangement. For example, you write:
<< The meaning of words is important precisely in order to discuss << their implications. Without agreeing on the meaning of the words we use, we are not having a conversation. >>
and
<< It seems to me that you have to admit that agitation involves seeking mass reception of a few simple ideas with the intention of a mass response, action of some kind. >>
Thus, we reluctantly take up the issue of definitions. Our definitions of propaganda and agitation are taken from Lenin's What is to be Done. In that book, Lenin not only gives his definitions, but also contrasts his definitions with those of Martynov, at the time a leader of the Economist trend (later a Menshevik, and ultimately a Stalinist). We do not view Lenin’s struggle with Martynov to be primarily over definitions in themselves, but rather a larger struggle over when and in what way it is appropriate to reach out to the masses. We are not concerned with whether you call the leaflets we have distributed “agitation” or “popular propaganda”, what is important is whether or not the various tasks are properly understood and are being accomplished. We note certain similarities between your criticisms of our usages of the terms, and Martynov's criticism of the Iskra group's usage.
Lenin stated that he understood agitation to mean "presenting only one or a few ideas... to a mass of people". We have stated our agreement with this definition.
While not formally disagreeing with the above definition, Martynov "interpreted" this definition "in the strict sense" to involve "calling the masses to certain concrete actions." While not formally disagreeing with Lenin's (and Plekhanov's) definition, you write "It seems to me that you have to admit that agitation involves seeking mass reception of a few simple ideas with the intention of a mass response, action of some kind..."
Martynov argued for raising demands that "would not be merely a hollow sound, because, promising certain palpable results, they might be actively supported by the masses of the workers". The implication is that agitation that fails to raise demands for certain palpable results, or which is not *actively* supported by masses of workers, is "merely a hollow sound". Your write: "If the audience is not expected to respond, then what would be the purpose of agitation ... simply to engender a passive recognition of a new idea? This conception does not seem useful to me, and it does not seem to me to reflect accurately what the word "agitation" has normally meant in our movement."
Lenin explicitly rejected the "improvements" to the definitions of propaganda and agitation proposed by Martynov. He also gave a concrete example of what he understood to be agitation -- a pamphlet which consisted of the first section of "Review of Home Affairs" dealing with the famine of 1901. Did the Iskra group have "a realistic expectation [of] action as a result" of this agitation? Lenin writes that the Iskra group, "tried to explain the inseparable connection between unemployment and the whole capitalist system; warned that 'famine is coming'; exposed the police...". They tried to explain, they warned, they exposed. No doubt "a mass response" or "action of some kind" on the part of the working class would have been welcomed by the Iskra group. But no mention is made of any expectation of a mass response. Nor there any mention of any actual mass response. Lenin emphasized that this agitational pamphlet contained not a single concrete demand. We might add, that it also contains not a single call for concrete actions.
Once again, we don’t think it is that important that we have different definitions, so long as we both understand each other. We hope though, that you are not opposed to widely distributing “popular propaganda” that may not see “a mass response, action of some kind.”
You inquired what me mean by the term "predominantly correct program".
What we have meant by a predominantly correct program is precisely one which “is correct on the very point that is most critical for a particular point in the struggle”, one which is correct “precisely on the essential elements in any given struggle.” We don't measure the correctness of an organization’s program by the percentage of correct sentences they publish, but by the actual role they play in class struggle. The fact that an organization campaigns for a bourgeois politician weighs hundreds of times more (if not thousands) than the fact of publishing Marx's Wage Labor and Capital. We wouldn't say that a centrist or reformist organization has a "predominantly correct program". So, by "predominantly correct program", we mean correct on the important issues, the critical issues, but possibly incorrect on secondary issues.
We wrote:
<< Proletarian Revolution, on the other hand, is written in a style such that it sends any *serious* reader off to further study -- and that is its chief merit. >>
To which you replied:
<< Your characterization of the function of PR as being primarily an inducement for further study of the Marxist classics is not quite accurate. Certainly we must have that effect, but that is not our main purpose. Our highest priority is essentially not just to encourage people to learn about Marxism in general but to convince others of the need to join us in building the party that can lead the working class based on a well-defined set of programmatic and theoretical ideas. >>
We think you may have misunderstood our comment. We were not implying that PR lacks a distinctive content. What we intended is this. Individuals who are *serious* about revolutionary politics are aware that those who have chosen to call themselves revolutionary are often in sharp disagreement with one another. These individuals will not, and if they are truly serious should not, accept the arguments presented in PR without studying the various claims and controversies further. PR can present your ideas, but winning actual conviction requires further study.
******
Peter
For the AL Collective